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Prelude to the Skybolt Crisis: U.S. nuclear assistance to France, McNamara’s Ann 
Arbor speech, and American attitudes to the British strategic nuclear deterrent during 
1962 
On 16 June 1962, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, gave one of 
the most famous speeches of the nuclear age when he delivered the commencement address 
at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.  The address has been remembered principally for 
its presentation of a controversial counterforce targeting doctrine in which McNamara, during 
the kind of clinical and dispassionate analysis for which he had already become synonymous, 
pictured a U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange where civilian casualties might be lessened by 
means of a more discriminating selection of targets than simply the destruction of urban areas 
of population.
1
  Up to this point there had never been such a detailed public statement from a 
senior American official regarding U.S. thinking on the conduct of nuclear war and how it 
could be managed.  When the speech was still being drafted, McGeorge Bundy, President 
John F. Kennedy’s Special Assistant for National Affairs, noted that it elaborated U.S. 
nuclear policy ‘with a depth and authority that have no public precedent’.2  The changing 
emphasis in U.S. nuclear targeting options outlined at Ann Arbor has tended to be the part of 
McNamara’s address now most featured in histories of the development of nuclear strategy, 
but aside from the principles of counterforce, it also contained several other important themes 
and messages.  These included strong criticism of the possession of independent, national 
nuclear forces by other members of the Western Alliance, forces which could undermine the 
planning and implementation of the kind of centrally-directed and coordinated nuclear strikes 
which would be necessary if the new targeting doctrine was to achieve its desired goals.  For 
contemporary commentators, McNamara’s rebuke that small nuclear forces, when operating 
independently, were ‘dangerous’, ‘expensive’, ‘prone to obsolescence’, and lacking in 
credibility as a deterrent, caught widespread attention because of what it seemed to reveal 
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about the Kennedy administration’s general attitude to the nuclear aspirations of its NATO 
allies, Britain and France. 
 This article will examine the background to these latter aspects of the Ann Arbor 
address and the ramifications the speech held for the nuclear relations between the principal 
members of the North Atlantic Alliance.  Although he had wanted to mount a critique of a 
French nuclear program which was still in its formative stages and developing free from 
Washington’s control – and perhaps also to draw a line under the debates within the Kennedy 
administration that had simmered over the previous few months on whether to offer nuclear 
assistance to France - it is clear from the evidence presented in this article that McNamara 
had not intended that his remarks should be taken as a U.S. attack on the British 
‘independent’ nuclear deterrent force, which by 1962 included over 100 modern V-bomber 
aircraft, many already equipped with high-yield thermonuclear weapons.  Nevertheless, the 
address created unwelcome dilemmas for the British government led by Harold Macmillan as 
it was forced to respond to McNamara’s strictures, while attempting to show fidelity to close 
Anglo-American relations, as well as simultaneously asserting its nuclear independence as it 
attempted to lower French resistance to Britain’s concurrent bid to join the European 
Economic Community (EEC). 
The British reaction to Ann Arbor was to expose some of the contradictions that lay at 
the heart of the Macmillan government’s position regarding the role that the UK deterrent 
assumed within the Western Alliance.  McNamara’s speech also played a key part, 
underplayed in some of the literature on Anglo-American nuclear relations, in fuelling later 
British suspicions in December 1962 that the Kennedy administration’s decision to cancel the 
Skybolt missile program was made not on the grounds of technical problems in development 
and cost effectiveness, as the Department of Defense then claimed, but was the fulfilment of 
a premediated move to drive the British out of the nuclear business.  In this way, Ann Arbor 
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formed the essential (and unwitting) prelude to the most serious crisis to afflict Anglo-
American nuclear relations in the post-war era.
3
 
 
The Kennedy Administration and U.S. Attitudes to the Development of British and 
French Nuclear Forces 
 
Swinging between acceptance of the technical aspects of U.S.-UK nuclear cooperation, which 
were enshrined in the July 1958 Agreement on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual 
Defense Purposes, reluctant acquiescence to providing the Macmillan government with a new 
delivery system to equip the V-bomber force (in the form of the Skybolt air-launched ballistic 
missile), and deep reservations over the continuing existence of Britain’s independent nuclear 
force, U.S. officials in the Kennedy administration frequently criticised the existence of a 
British nuclear program as a distraction from the more urgent priority of building 
conventional military capabilities in NATO, and as a goad to other European powers – such 
as France, but also West Germany - which might also might aspire to a similar nuclear 
status.
4
  The French exploded their first test device in February 1960, and President Charles 
de Gaulle had plans to start to equip the French Air Force with nuclear-capable aircraft by 
1964, and to develop an indigenous ballistic missile program.
5
 To some anxious U.S. 
observers, unchecked French nuclear ambitions, along with the preferential treatment 
accorded to Britain since 1958 with the provision of valuable nuclear assistance in the 
warhead field, served to encourage others down the unwelcome path of proliferation, with 
most concern centered on the prospect that the West German government harboured desires 
to somehow acquire or control nuclear weapons.
6
 
Growing doubts about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Western Europe 
in the late 1950s, combined with concerns over possible German nuclear ambitions, led the 
4 
 
Eisenhower administration to advocate a policy of nuclear sharing within the North Atlantic 
Alliance through the creation of a Multilateral Force (MLF).  First presented to the NATO 
Council in December 1960, and soon adopted also by the Kennedy administration, the MLF 
was intended as a new European medium-range ballistic missile force, jointly financed, 
owned and controlled by its members.  Its surface vessels, carrying its U.S.-supplied Polaris 
missiles, were to be crewed by mixed national contingents, ensuring that all its prospective 
participants - including most importantly Germany - enjoyed a share in the Alliance’s nuclear 
capacity, planning and decision-making, and that none would enjoy exclusive ‘national’ 
control over the force.  At the same time, Washington would be careful never to accede to 
relinquishing its veto over final nuclear use of an MLF were it to be created.
7
 
The conviction of many members of the State Department by the early 1960s was that 
the existence of the UK strategic nuclear force acted as encouragement for the French and 
Germans to aspire to the same type of national capability and status, and impeded 
Washington’s attempts to find multilateral solutions, via the MLF proposals, to NATO’s 
nuclear dilemmas.  Moreover, provision of the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile, agreed 
by the Eisenhower administration in early 1960 when it was at an early stage of development 
- and a step seen in some quarters as a quid pro quo for the Macmillan government’s 
acquiescence with the basing of the first U.S. Polaris submarines at Holy Loch in Scotland in 
that same year - threatened to extend the effective life of the V-bomber force for at least 
another decade.
8
  The basic problem here was that no political strings had been attached to 
the UK’s eventual purchase of Skybolt, so that it might be bound into some multinational 
system of nuclear control, while U.S. design information derived from the close nuclear 
collaboration established by the 1958 Agreement would assist the UK authorities in 
manufacturing their own warhead for the missile.  With its own chain of national command 
and authority to launch the V-force, the British government could plausibly maintain the 
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position that it had an independent capability which both contributed to the deterrent strength 
of the Western Alliance as a whole, and served as a last resort method of retaliation if 
national survival was at stake and the United States could not necessarily be relied upon to 
use its own nuclear forces to deter or defeat a Soviet attack.
9
 
Open expression of doubt that the United States could be relied on in all 
circumstances to respond to Soviet aggression in Europe was not often heard from British 
ministers during this period – it would be impolitic to do so, and could weaken the 
impression of strong and credible Western deterrent – but privately it was recognised that 
there were advantages if Soviet leaders understood there was a separate means of nuclear 
retaliation whose political control was located in Europe.
10
  As one Ministry of Defence 
official expressed it just a few days after the Ann Arbor speech: 
Deterrence requires the obvious will and ability to extract an unacceptable price for 
aggression.  We do not dispute American capability to devastate the Soviet Union if 
necessary.  We sometimes have misgivings about their “obvious will” to risk their 
own devastation.  That is why neither we nor the French are yet willing to have to rely 
solely on the Americans for our nuclear protection.  We intend to retain for HMG 
[Her Majesty’s Government] the ability to take an independent decision to initiate 
nuclear operations that would extract an unacceptable price from an aggressor.  So 
long as we retain this independence, it has to be taken into account in the formulation 
of policy and strategy in both Moscow and Washington.  We consider that these 
advantages outweigh the risks if the deterrent should fail.
11
 
The ability to inflict great damage on the Soviet Union by nationally-controlled nuclear 
means became a powerful marker of status within the North Atlantic Alliance.  As Frank 
Costigliola has argued,  
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Many Europeans believed that an independent nuclear force was the criterion of 
sovereignty and political power. Even if the French or British forces could not destroy 
the Soviet Union, they could, as de Gaulle put it, “tear off an arm”” or trigger a 
nuclear war which America would be forced to enter. Thus weapons of mass 
destruction, which could be used only irrationally, became assimilated into ostensibly 
rational political debate.
12
 
 Misgivings over the independent status of the UK nuclear program were evident from 
the early stages of the Kennedy administration.
13
  In April 1961, following approval by the 
National Security Council, the President issued a document on policy toward the North 
Atlantic Alliance which laid new stress on enhancing NATO’s capabilities for conventional 
defence.  Regarding nuclear policy, it recommended that the British should be encouraged to 
make a clear assignment of their nuclear forces to NATO, and noted: ‘Over the long run, it 
would be desirable if the British decided to phase out of the nuclear deterrent business.  If the 
development of Skybolt is not warranted for U.S. purposes alone, the U.S. should not prolong 
the life of the V-bomber force by this or other means.’14   The following month, in Ottawa, in 
front of the Canadian Parliament, Kennedy made clear the direction he wanted his 
administration to go by announcing U.S. intentions to commit five Polaris submarines to 
NATO command (as a reinforcement of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to the Alliance) and also 
to look toward the creation of a ‘NATO sea-borne force, which would be truly multi-lateral in 
ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our Allies, once 
NATO’s non-nuclear goals have been achieved.’15   
 Anything that conflicted with the objective of moving away from national deterrents 
was to be discouraged, which made both the French and British nuclear programs an 
unwelcome headache for U.S. policymakers.  So, for example, in February 1962 U.S. 
officials objected strenuously to a passage in the annual British Defence White Paper which 
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mentioned that the strategic nuclear deterrent made a ‘significant’ contribution to Western 
strength, would be maintained throughout the 1960s, and ‘by itself [was] enough to make a 
potential aggressor fear that our retaliation would inflict destruction beyond any level which 
he would be prepared to tolerate.’16  Kennedy wrote to Macmillan to express his ‘special 
concern’ about such statements.   Alluding to the major reappraisal of NATO’s nuclear 
policies which was then in train, and the pressures building up for independent nuclear 
capabilities, Kennedy thought that they ‘may well have the effect of convincing de Gaulle of 
the rightness of his course …[and] hasten the day when Germany will pursue a national 
program.’  Public statements, he remonstrated, should take into account such considerations, 
adding ‘we ourselves are prepared to be as forthcoming as possible to meet our objective of 
finding a NATO solution to head off independent national aspirations.’17 
Macmillan chose to reply in defensive fashion, expressing his appreciation that the 
President felt able to write to him in such a candid manner.  The government’s upcoming 
statement on defence to the House of Commons, Macmillan stressed, would emphasise that 
Britain was making a contribution to the West’s deterrent as a whole.  Moreover, while 
British possession of a force of V-bombers during the 1960s was a fact which could not be 
ignored, this did not ‘in itself rule out a completely different organisation of the Western 
deterrent.’  So as not to cause any misunderstanding, the Prime Minister added that he did 
not, however, believe it would be possible to form a NATO deterrent force on multilateral 
lines.  As for the UK’s force, 
Our contribution, important though it is, is relatively small.  But I have never been 
persuaded that its existence necessarily encourages the French and the Germans to try 
to develop their own independent nuclear capacity; they will be moved or deterred by 
quite other factors.  Indeed, I think one can argue quite plausibly that the existence of 
the British nuclear force gives some comfort both to those Europeans who fear that 
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the United States might, in the last resort, shrink from using the nuclear deterrent for 
the defence of Europe, and to those who, contrariwise, are worried lest America might 
use it too precipitately. 
There were advantages for the United States, Macmillan suggested, for being able to share 
nuclear responsibilities.  Having thought deeply through the issues, the Prime Minister felt 
that in the absence of concrete measures of disarmament it would not ultimately be possible 
to prevent other powers from acquiring their own nuclear capabilities, however crude these 
might prove to be.
18
 
It is quite apparent from the documentary record that Macmillan was attracted by the 
idea of exchanging, at some point in the future, complete ‘independence’ for the UK deterrent 
for fulfilment of larger policy goals.
19
  He was prepared, for example, to contemplate the idea 
of an Anglo-French nuclear force - under shared political control - as one way to satisfy de 
Gaulle’s aspirations to play a leading role in Alliance affairs, and as an option, through the 
provision of nuclear assistance to France, which might also secure his key policy goal of UK 
entrance into the EEC.  In April 1961, Macmillan had in fact written to Kennedy saying ‘we 
should be ready to go a long way to meet de Gaulle in certain fields of interest to him.’  The 
French program, if given technical help, could be conceived as not as an independent 
capability, but making a contribution to the Western deterrent as a whole, a conception which 
informed British views of their own deterrent force.
20
 
This approach was, however, considered and rejected by Kennedy administration 
officials in 1961, seeing it as a course which would only stimulate German nuclear ambitions, 
while doubts were also present over French reliability.  Kennedy’s formal reply to Macmillan 
explained he had come to the 
conclusion that it would be undesirable to assist France’s efforts to create a nuclear 
weapons capability.  I am most anxious that no erroneous impressions get abroad 
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regarding future U.S policy in this respect, lest they create unwarranted French 
expectations and serious divisions in NATO.  If we were to help France acquire a 
nuclear weapons capability, this could not fail to have a major effect on German 
attitudes. 
The policy of the U.S. administration would be to try to respond to French concerns over the 
nuclear arrangements of the Alliance, rather than to assist their national program, and the 
Americans would expect British support in this endeavour.
21
 
Kennedy’s rebuff to Macmillan’s ideas did not mean the issue of nuclear assistance to 
France could stay off his policy agenda for very long.  For one, it was apparent to many 
observers that the French government was determined to push forward with its nuclear 
program whatever actions the U.S. took, making its attainment of nuclear capability 
inevitable.  An important advocate for U.S. nuclear assistance to France during this period 
was James M. Gavin, the Francophile former general who has led U.S. airborne forces with 
great distinction during the Second World War and had forged a good relationship with de 
Gaulle.  In March 1961, hoping to improve Franco-American ties, Kennedy had sent Gavin to 
Paris as U.S. Ambassador.  Over the subsequent months, according to McGeorge Bundy, 
Gavin ‘had become deeply bothered by the gradual deterioration of Franco-American 
relations, and he was persuaded that the principal cause of this difficulty lay in the failure of 
the United States to meet the hopes of the French in the nuclear field.’22  If this policy 
continued, the Ambassador feared, it would only drive France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany closer, and he suspected, according to his confident, The New York Times’ Cyrus 
Sulzberger, that ‘the French and the Germans are edging toward a secret agreement under 
which France would supply Germany with nuclear warheads which the U.S. refuses to give 
either country.’23  But Gavin’s advice on such matters did not find favor within the State 
Department (particularly from the Under Secretary of State, George Ball), whose officials 
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had resented Gavin’s initial appointment and believed he was too much in thrall to the French 
position.  The danger with Gavin, as Bundy was advising the President by February 1962, 
was that he was ‘an enthusiast for the French position’ on nuclear questions.  There was 
much press speculation that he was to be replaced, and Bundy wondered ‘there is some 
question as to whether Jim is not a round peg in a square hole on this particular job.’24   
Gavin’s view was that it made sense to offer help to the French in the nuclear field: it 
would remove French irritation at the apparent double standards operating (when the 
Americans collaborated so closely with Britain under the 1958 Agreement); gain favour with 
de Gaulle; and ensure that the French did not squander their defence resources on 
unproductive lines of technical nuclear development.  One area of possible assistance was 
with the supply from U.S. sources of expensive-to-produce highly enriched uranium (the 
French were building a uranium enrichment plant at Pierrelatte, at an estimated cost of $700 
million, but it was reported to be behind schedule).   A tentative request from French officials 
for the supply of U-235 was forwarded to Washington by Gavin on 14 November 1961, only 
for it to be turned down a week later in firm fashion in a message from Dean Rusk, the U.S. 
Secretary of State, which told Gavin – in a message reviewed and approved by the President 
– ‘that we will undertake no action likely to result in any direct or significant aid to France in 
developing or securing independent nuclear warhead or effective nuclear weapon delivery 
capability.’25 
At the end of December 1961, Kennedy had written to de Gaulle to convey his 
continued opposition to support for an independent French nuclear program.  ‘What troubles 
us, decisively, in the case of a specifically French nuclear capability,’ the President tried to 
explain, ‘is that if we should join in that effort, we would have no ground on which to resist 
certain and heavy pressure from the Germans for parallel treatment. Yet it is imperative that 
the Germans not have nuclear weapons of their own; memory is too strong, and fear too real, 
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for that.’    Expressing scepticism that a purely national program would be economically 
viable in view of the technical developments being made in the weapons field and the 
resources required to keep pace with them, Kennedy also noted that the United States had the 
same doubt about Great Britain. We have cooperated with the British on atomic 
energy since early in World War II, and we cannot now break a connection so long 
developed in mutual trust. But we do not believe that as the nuclear age advances the 
United Kingdom will be able to sustain an effective deterrent of a national type alone. 
I believe this view is shared by some of our most knowledgeable British friends.  If 
Great Britain were today in the position of France, and if we did not have existing 
commitments on the exchange of information, I can assure you that our policy toward 
her would not differ from our present policy toward France.  At present, and I believe 
for some time to come, the deterrent force of the United States protects Europe too. 
This is so because of the clarity of our commitment, the superiority of our overall 
force, and, if I may say so, my personal determination. 
Rather than offer assistance to the French programme, Kennedy instead inquired whether 
France would be ready to enter into consultations over the problems connected with the 
nuclear defence of Europe.
 26
 
De Gaulle simply replied that France was not asking for American nuclear help and 
that he could understand why the United States was unwilling to share such secrets, even with 
an ally.  While admitting that to create a nuclear force on a par with the Soviet Union would 
take enormous resources, the French President continued: 
But how can one evaluate the degree of destructive power required to constitute a 
deterrent? Even if your enemy is armed in such a manner that he can kill you ten 
times, the fact that you have the means with which to kill him once or even merely 
tear off his arms may give him pause.  Moreover, in the West France is not alone.  Its 
12 
 
atomic force will certainly add something to the power of the Free World.  But, when 
the time comes, it will doubtless be advisable to organize the combined use of 
Western nuclear weapons.
27
 
This cool response meant there would be no immediate follow-up but U.S. officials 
acknowledged that the issue of possible US assistance to France was far from closed, 
particularly as press speculation over the subject intensified.  While few in the administration 
backed the idea of an extensive offer of nuclear information in the area of warhead design, as 
was provided to the UK under the 1958 Agreement, there was interest in making an opening 
offer of advice with Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) technology, where French 
work had begun but the expense involved in developing the technology was known to be 
substantial.  
  The subject of nuclear assistance to France was examined once again by the 
Kennedy administration during the first few months of 1962.  Gavin continued to argue 
during this period that a refusal to discuss cooperation in the nuclear field was a prime source 
of the overall discord in Franco-American relations that was by now being widely reported by 
the press on both sides of the Atlantic.
28
  Civilian elements at the Department of Defense, 
moreover, were concerned to explore practical cooperation with France over such as matters 
as the build-up of conventional forces in Europe (as the Algerian war came to an end, so 
allowing the redeployment of some French forces), the defence spending burden placed on 
France by its nuclear program, and the prospect of French purchases in the nuclear-related 
field offsetting U.S. military expenditures in France, which were a drain on the balance of 
payments.   The principal figure within the Pentagon associated with a new approach to 
France was Paul H. Nitze, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Affairs, but there was some support also from Roswell Gilpatric, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, and from McNamara himself.  A sceptic regarding the potential of European 
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integration or multilateral schemes, Nitze preferred to focus on the importance of the bilateral 
relationship with France, and was prepared to see nuclear assistance extended in a similar 
way to that offered to the UK a few years earlier.  An additional source of advocacy was 
General Maxwell B. Taylor, the President’s personal military representative, who had visited 
France at the end of March 1962 and returned ‘deeply impressed by the unanimity of the 
Frenchmen with whom he talked, in passionate commitment to development of a nuclear 
capability, and in passionate resentment of the refusal of the Americans to provide 
assistance.’29   
But after Nitze had held tentative discussions on the subject with the French 
Ambassador in Washington in February, press reporting of French criticisms of American 
refusal to accept an independent French nuclear force, combined with strong State 
Department opposition, was enough to persuade Kennedy to drop any idea of a formal 
approach to de Gaulle.
30
  At the end of February, nevertheless, Nitze suggested examination 
of a program for changing the nature of the nuclear relationship with France, starting with 
initial discussions with French officials.  ‘We do not today have any clear view as to what 
might or might not be possible in this area,’ Nitze explained.  ‘The French have not been 
willing to make any worthwhile exploratory overtures to us.  We have not gone very far in 
exploring ideas with them.’  He now wanted some groundwork laid ‘for an incision in the 
most bitter issue that now divides us and the French.’31  The Director of Armaments in the 
French Ministry of Defence, General Gaston Lavaud, came to Washington from 4-16 March 
1962 with a long shopping list for U.S. equipment or support, some of it connected to the 
French ballistic missile program.  Lavaud’s main point of contact at the Pentagon during his 
visit was Nitze, and the visit served to prompt intense discussion between the Defense and 
State Departments over whether help to France over areas such as ballistic missile technology 
would indirectly assist the French nuclear program.  Strong opposition to the provision of 
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anything which might contribute to nuclear delivery systems came from Ball and Rusk, the 
latter directing Nitze and Gilpatric, for example, not to open any talks which covered missile 
components or technology.
32
 
The U.S. Secretary of State was convinced that if nuclear aid were offered to France 
with conditions (such as French support for an MLF, and the commitment of French nuclear 
forces to NATO), this would be resented by de Gaulle, while his demands for greater U.S. 
recognition of France’s leadership in Europe were only likely to be intensified.  As one State 
Department memorandum on the subject maintained, ‘He wants aid, but he probably does not 
expect it, and he might respect us less – rather than more – if we showed susceptibility to 
pressure by granting it.’  There would also be numerous negative consequences for U.S. 
policy as a whole to the NATO Alliance if such an initiative were taken, and the West 
German government would probably clamor for similar forms of assistance, which could help 
to encourage them in developing their own nuclear potential. 
33
 By this time French officials 
were already voicing open criticism of American refusal to accept the reality of the French 
nuclear program by offering to give France direct assistance in this field, and public 
ventilation of the issue did nothing to persuade President Kennedy to modify his views.
34
 
Lavaud returned home with little progress made on the equipment purchases it had been 
hoped might serve to alleviate the U.S. balance of payments burden caused in part by the 
stationing of U.S. forces in France.  Gilpatric explained for Ball’s benefit that, ‘the French are 
not prepared to increase substantially their purchase of U.S. military equipment unless we are 
willing to relax our present policy of not assisting them in advanced weapons technology.  If 
adhered to, this attitude means not only that the French will do nothing to improve materially 
the U.S. balance of payments account with France but also that they will not look to us for 
assistance in re-equipping their forces with modern conventional armament.  As Bob 
[McNamara] and I said …without such help we doubt that the French divisions will, at least 
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for an unacceptably long period of time, attain the level of combat readiness which is 
essential if the current planning for the use of NATO forces is to be meaningful.’35 
Indeed, as noted above, Franco-American relations were entering a period of deep 
antagonism, as de Gaulle treated the U.S. administration’s efforts to influence European 
developments, especially in the nuclear field, with profound suspicion.
36
  At a meeting held 
on 16 April 1962, the provision of nuclear assistance to France was ruled out for the time 
being, and it was decided that the State Department would renew its push for the European 
members of NATO to form a multilateral MRBM force with U.S. support.  At this gathering 
McNamara voiced his belief that nuclear help would probably not serve to alter de Gaulle’s 
attitudes to the Alliance, but at the same time there was nothing that could stop the French 
developing a nuclear delivery capability.  Nuclear assistance might, on a ‘narrow military 
view’, lessen the strain on French military budgets, improve the U.S. balance of payments 
position, and induce the French to be more cooperative over the formation of an MLF.  In 
reply to McNamara’s point that French nuclear development was inevitable and so it made 
little sense to deny assistance if it had any chance of yielding some concessions, Rusk was 
adamant that the U.S. should not be in the business of subsidising the costs of other powers’ 
nuclear programs:   
in effect we should be reducing the price of entry into the nuclear field.  [His] view 
was that we should instead seek a way to reduce our special nuclear relation to the 
British.  The re-establishing of such nuclear sharing with the British in 1958 had been 
a mistake. 
The other NATO allies would react very badly if the U.S. was found to be starting even  
tentative discussions with France, Rusk argued, and such a bilateral approach would be 
‘disastrous’.   Kennedy agreed with the State Department’s opposition to nuclear assistance to 
France, feeling it was ‘wrong to move on this matter now.’  Regarding the MRBM proposals, 
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McNamara was extremely doubtful of their military necessity, but accepted that policy in this 
area had to be advanced for political reasons.
37
   
One result of these deliberations was National Security Action Memorandum 148, 
‘Guidance on U.S. Nuclear Assistance to France’, issued by President Kennedy on 18 April 
1962.  This ordered officials to ensure that in their background briefings with the press they 
should make it understood that the recent stories that the administration was moving to 
provide aid to the French MRBM and nuclear program were ‘without foundation’.  Indeed, 
U.S. officials were told explicitly they were not to discuss the subject with their French 
counterparts.
38
  That same day, at a presidential news conference, replying to a question 
about the possibility of providing nuclear assistance to France, the President reiterated that it 
was U.S. policy to discourage the spread or proliferation of nuclear weapons.  As Bundy later 
recalled Kennedy saying he did not believe that de Gaulle would change his policies in return 
for nuclear assistance: ‘You would probably get money from him, but that’s all you’d get.’  
‘His personal responsibility for the nuclear posture of the West was never far from his mind,’ 
Bundy wrote of the President, ‘and he had an almost instinctive doubt that he could ease thus 
burden by sharing it.  The path of nuclear diffusion seemed to lead away from that limitation 
of the atomic arms race on which he never gave up hope.’39   
 
The EEC Negotiations and Anglo-French Nuclear Collaboration 
 
The State Department’s success during April in gaining White House backing for a fresh 
attempt to sell the idea of a multilateral MRBM force to the European allies of the United 
States was ill-timed for Macmillan and his senior officials.  Negotiations to enter the 
Common Market had stalled during the spring of 1962, and breaking down de Gaulle’s 
aversion to UK membership was considered essential if Britain’s was to succeed, while the 
17 
 
French President was known to be adamantly opposed to the whole MRBM scheme.  The 
temptation for the Prime Minister during this period was to offer UK technical knowledge to 
the French nuclear program, but this could only be done with the acquiescence of the U.S. as 
much of the information now in the hands of British nuclear scientists was acquired as a 
result of collaboration with the U.S. under the 1958 Agreement, which forbade the transfer of 
such information to third parties.
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Considering the debates that had recently occurred in Washington, any British nuclear 
offer to France, however tentative, was not likely to be welcomed in the Kennedy 
administration, a fact appreciated by British Foreign Office officials. Before Macmillan’s 
arrival in the U.S. capital for a visit in late April, Bundy advised Kennedy that ‘there is 
nothing for us in any possible British notion that the UK might pay its entrance fee to the 
Common Market by providing nuclear assistance to the French.  In such a case the British 
would be appeasing the French with our secrets, and no good would come of it for Europe or 
for us.’41 Senior British officials who accompanied the Prime Minister on his trip reported 
that Rusk, Bundy and George Ball, had asked them whether any overtures from the French 
regarding nuclear cooperation were expected ‘as their price for letting us into the Common 
Market.’  When the reply was offered that such a French proposal was not anticipated, and 
would in any event by rejected on the British side, Rusk expressed relief, saying that it would 
have created problems for Washington if a bargain of this sort was floated.  The United 
States, Rusk had confirmed, was determined not to help France with nuclear weapons 
technology either directly, or through the UK.
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During his April 1962 visit to Washington, Macmillan had once again presented to 
Kennedy his proposal of placing British and French nuclear forces ‘in trust’, serving the 
defence interests of Western Europe within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.  Such 
notions were ‘vague and undeveloped’, Macmillan admitted, and presented some major 
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difficulties – such as the reluctance of either government to surrender independent control of 
their own nuclear forces – but he was clear that the ‘basic idea is that, when the enlarged 
European Community exists, the nuclear capability of the two members which have such a 
capability should somehow be given a European label, without withdrawing it from 
NATO.’43 Kennedy had told the Prime Minister in private conversation that the proposal was 
premature and would only be worth considering if it could buy something ‘really spectacular 
like full French cooperation in NATO and elsewhere plus British entry into the European 
Economic Community.’  He also wanted to warn Macmillan off making any such suggestion 
to de Gaulle.
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 The Prime Minister must have emerged from this exchange anxious that his 
room for manoeuvre in the final stages of talks over EEC entry would be curtailed by the 
emerging trends in the U.S. approach to the nuclear problems of the Western Alliance. 
Indeed, American policy, reflecting the outcome of the meeting Kennedy had held 
with his senior advisers on 16 April, was now ready to push forward with ideas for an MLF 
within the NATO Alliance, where the national role for British and French forces might 
eventually fade away.   As Bundy noted: ‘We want the British in Europe, and we do not 
really see much point in the separate British nuclear deterrent, beyond our existing Skybolt 
commitment; we would much rather have British efforts go into conventional weapons and 
have the British join with the rest of NATO in accepting a single U.S.-dominated NATO 
force.’45 But if London was now expected by Washington to offer support for a NATO-
controlled nuclear force, this could place Britain in the difficult position of having to align 
itself against de Gaulle on one of the most sensitive issues of French external policy.  
Moreover, subscribing UK strategic nuclear forces to a multilateral scheme which would 
form part of a combined Western and U.S.-led targeting effort and be subject to a U.S. veto 
over final decisions for use – if that was what the Americans eventually hoped to see - would 
probably put paid to any notion of using the idea of a collaborative Anglo-French nuclear 
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effort, held ‘in trust’ for Europe (but free of U.S. control), as a possible bargaining chip in the 
EEC negotiations with France. 
The British position was that an MLF would be militarily unworkable, politically 
dangerous and unwarrantably expensive.  ‘If the Americans want to help us to negotiate our 
way into Europe,’ one Foreign Office telegram opined, ‘they must not expect us to take up a 
position on this important nuclear matter which will only confirm de Gaulle’s suspicions that 
we are incapable of maintaining a point of view independent of the Americans on a matter of 
vital interest to European defence.’46  To Philip de Zulueta, Principal Private Secretary to the 
Prime Minister, and one of Macmillan’s closest advisers on foreign affairs, there was also 
concern that the recent tenor of U.S. policy made it doubtful that the previous close, bilateral 
nuclear relationship with the Americans could be maintained indefinitely, but what might 
replace it when the alternatives seemed to be either complete dependence on the United 
States, or a nebulous ‘European’ deterrent, perhaps organised around an Anglo-French core 
effort if Britain became a member of the European Community, was still highly uncertain.  
‘We have refused to bribe the French [with offers of nuclear collaboration] to let us into the 
Common Market,’ de Zulueta noted, ‘so as not to jeopardise this special relationship [with 
the Americans] which we may now find quite useless.’47  
 
McNamara and U.S. nuclear strategy: Athens and Ann Arbor 
  
It was against this background of Anglo-American divergence over the nuclear arrangements 
of the Alliance and only a few days after Macmillan’s departure from Washington, that on 5 
May 1962 McNamara spoke before the NATO Council in Athens in what was the first of two 
landmark pronouncements on U.S. nuclear strategy, in presentations which also encapsulated 
the Kennedy administration’s growing hostility to the existence of independent national 
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nuclear forces.  Because of their very public nature, of even greater significance than 
McNamara’s speech at Athens, was the unclassified version of McNamara’s remarks 
delivered a little over a month later, on 16 June, when the Secretary of Defense gave the 
commencement address at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor.   As he had in Athens, 
McNamara referred to the current controversies within NATO, including the erosion of the 
credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Western Europe in view of the increasing U.S. 
vulnerability to direct nuclear attack from the Soviet Union.  This, in turn, had prompted a 
belief that ‘nuclear capabilities are alone relevant in the face of the growing nuclear threat, 
and that independent national nuclear forces are sufficient to protect the nations of Europe.’  
Refuting these positions, McNamara instead maintained that interdependence and the closest 
coordination of defence effort between the allies were now needed.  The Alliance, he argued, 
had the overall nuclear strength to meet any challenge it confronted, and it was strength, 
moreover which not only reduced the chances of a ‘major nuclear war’ but made possible a 
strategy ‘designed to preserve the fabric of our societies if war should occur.’  Non-nuclear 
forces, he was also keen to stress, could enhance deterrence.  If deterrence should break 
down, however, basic U.S. strategy in a nuclear war should be aimed at the ‘destruction of 
the enemy’s military forces, not of his civilian population.’ 
Such a counterforce approach to targeting, made possible by anticipated 
improvements in the design and accuracy of nuclear weapons, held the prospect of prevailing 
in the event of nuclear war while limiting civilian casualties to the maximum degree possible.  
In this eventuality, McNamara argued, ‘relatively weak nuclear forces with enemy cities as 
their targets are not likely to be adequate to perform the function of deterrence.’  Instead, if 
they were ‘small, and perhaps vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, a major 
antagonist can take a variety of measures to counter them.’  Moreover, if such an antagonist 
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thought there was a chance such a small force could be used independently, this might even 
invite pre-emptive attack.  And in the case of war   
the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be 
tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets 
would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict.  Meanwhile, the 
creation of a single additional national nuclear force encourages the proliferation of 
nuclear power with all of its attendant dangers.  In short, then, limited nuclear 
capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to 
obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. 
The emphasis in U.S. nuclear strategy had to be on ‘unity of planning, concentration of 
executive authority, and central direction’ so that a properly coordinated campaign could be 
launched to destroy the enemy’s nuclear capabilities.  McNamara intoned that there must not 
be ‘competing and conflicting strategies’ in the event of nuclear war.48 
The previous month, in the closed NATO session at Athens, McNamara had been a 
little more explicit about the problems of divided command and control of nuclear forces.  A 
counterforce strategy would involve, ‘carefully choosing targets, pre-planning strikes, 
coordinating attacks, and assessing results, as well as allocating and directing follow-on 
attacks from the center.  These call, in our view, for a greater degree of Alliance participation 
in formulating nuclear policies and consulting on the appropriate occasions for using these 
weapons.  Beyond this, it is essential that we centralize the decision to use our nuclear 
weapons to the greatest extent possible.  We would all find it intolerable to contemplate 
having only a part of the strategic force launched in isolation from our main striking power.’  
McNamara stressed the dangers if a portion of the Alliance’s nuclear force was used in an 
uncoordinated fashion to launch a retaliatory attack against Soviet military targets, so 
‘endangering all of us’, and that ‘equally intolerable’ would be 
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one segment of the Alliance force attacking urban industrial areas while, with the bulk 
of our forces, we were succeeding in destroying most of the enemy’s nuclear 
capabilities.  Such a failure in coordination might lead to the destruction of our 
hostages – the Soviet cities – just at a time at which our strategy of coercing the 
Soviets into stopping their aggression was on the verge of success.  Failure to achieve 
central control of NATO nuclear forces would mean running the risk of bringing 
down on us the catastrophe which we most urgently wish to avoid.
49
 
It is, of course, ironic that one of McNamara’s aims at both Athens and Ann Arbor 
was to reinforce the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Western Europe by making 
the point that U.S. cities would not necessarily have to be sacrificed in the event of hostilities 
in a NATO-Warsaw Pact armed clash on the Central Front.  Instead, however, his analysis 
tended to provoke concerns that the U.S. was planning to conduct the kind of controlled and 
confined nuclear exchange which would leave Europe a devastated nuclear battlefield, while 
counterforce targeting implied that disabling first strike options might become more tempting 
to decision-makers in Washington in the midst of a crisis where war seemed imminent.  In 
retrospect, moreover, it is clear that the theoretical targeting options which McNamara had 
outlined were far ahead of what lay within the capabilities of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces 
then in existence.  The nuclear target planning undertaken by the U.S. military authorities 
throughout this period, and the philosophy that underpinned it, remained wedded to a large-
scale and overwhelming use of nuclear weapons against an extensive list of military, 
industrial and economic targets in the Soviet Union and the territories it controlled.  Indeed, it 
would not be until the mid-1970s that the kind of selective and discriminating nuclear strikes 
envisaged by McNamara in 1962 would start to find their way into such targeting plans (for 
one, U.S. command, control and communications systems were simply not advanced enough 
to conduct the kind of extended and discriminating nuclear campaign postulated).
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  Marc 
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Trachtenberg has cast doubt on whether McNamara and the President ever really believed in 
such counterforce/no cities options, and that the real function of these pronouncements was 
political: in attacking the notion of separate national nuclear forces a further marker was 
delivered that the administration would do nothing to foster German nuclear ambitions.
51
 
It was also the case that such addresses were designed as a reminder that the Alliance had to 
show more commitment to the build-up of conventional forces if the general nuclear war-
fighting strategies that were becoming available to Washington were never to be put into 
effect.  Kennedy had read McNamara’s Ann Arbor speech in draft form, put forward his own 
amendments, and had wanted the Secretary of Defense to ‘repeat to the point of boredom that 
our general war response will come only if our allies are subjected to major attack.’52 
For European observers there could be no mistaking the increasingly outspoken tone 
of hostility to national nuclear forces now coming from the administration, coupled with a 
new push to sell the MLF concept within the North Atlantic Alliance.  In the middle of May, 
after McNamara’s Athens address, Kennedy was asked at one of his regular news 
conferences about his attitudes toward independent nuclear forces, and replied: ‘We do not 
believe in a series of national deterrents.  We believe that the NATO deterrent, to which the 
United States had committed itself so heavily, provides very adequate protection.  Once you 
begin, nation after nation, beginning to develop its own deterrent, or rather feeling it’s 
necessary as an element of its independence to develop its own deterrent, it seems to me that 
you are moving into an increasingly dangerous situation.’53  Just a few days before the 
President had delivered these remarks, Bundy had furnished Kennedy with a memorandum 
which attempted to summarise the convoluted evolution of views within the U.S. bureaucracy 
over the previous few months regarding nuclear assistance to France.  Summing up the 
argument against providing help, he wrote that nuclear diffusion 
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was a strategic nonsense; the Western nuclear deterrent was fundamentally 
indivisible…. There could be only one serious nuclear war against the Soviet Union – 
and the prevention of that war, by credible deterrence, could in no way be assisted by 
the addition of small, ill-controlled, vulnerable, and wholly independent national 
nuclear forces.  Measured in terms of defense against Soviet Russia, the French force 
in prospect could only be a danger to all – including the French themselves. 
The real purpose of the French program, as de Gaulle was reported to have admitted in 
private conversation, was in the bargaining power it could give him within the Western 
Alliance – why should the United States bolster French capabilities if this was de Gaulle’s 
aim?
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White House reservations over any UK nuclear initiative involving France were 
compounded by the re-emergence of State Department opposition to Britain’s independent 
nuclear status in the run-up to Ann Arbor.   Towards the end of May, Rusk had received a 
memorandum from Foy Kohler, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, which outlined 
a program of action regarding the UK independent nuclear capability and the Anglo-
American nuclear relationship.  Remarking that little had been done to persuade the British to 
‘phase out’ their independent deterrent, as had been advocated in the NSC Policy Directive of 
April 1961, Kohler now saw the need to bring the matter to a head because of the current UK 
negotiations over EEC entry, which could raise the undesirable issue of UK nuclear 
assistance to France, but also because Macmillan had recently (in February’s Defence White 
Paper) signalled his intention to maintain an independent deterrent throughout the 1960s.  
This British position, Kohler noted, stood at odds with the criticisms of weak national nuclear 
forces that McNamara had recently put forward during his Athens speech, and was not 
helpful to U.S. arguments that the conventional strength of the Alliance should be bolstered. 
Kohler advised that 
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The heart of the matter is that we should avoid any actions to increase the degree of 
our special nuclear relationship with the UK.  We should make clear that we are not 
prepared to extend that relation, notably in regard to creation of a UK Polaris missile 
force.  The British will undoubtedly show a continuing interest in acquiring Polaris or 
other missile-bearing submarines, as they come closer to the end of the effective life 
of the V-bomber force.  Even if that life is prolonged through Skybolt, the V-bomber 
force is a wasting asset…If the V-bombers are not replaced by a sea-borne missile 
force, the independent British deterrent will expire... 
In view of what was to occur later, it was also pertinent that Kohler warned that while the 
U.S. should explore with the UK the idea of a commitment of their strategic nuclear force to 
NATO, this should not be done ‘until we see how action to this end could be fitted in with the 
concept of a genuinely multilateral force.  We would not want commitment of V-bombers to 
substitute for full UK participation in the multilateral force or to set a pattern for a 
multilateral force based on national contingents rather than on units under multilateral 
ownership, control and manning.’55 
Within Kennedy’s close circle of advisers there were renewed doubts being expressed 
over the nuclear relationship with the UK that had been forged in 1958, considering the 
difficulty it placed in the path of forming a MLF within NATO, and the friction it tended to 
introduce to the Franco-American relationship.  Writing to the French political scientist 
Raymond Aron in late May 1962, Bundy confirmed that much of the U.S. feeling over 
offering assistance to France was that the nuclear defence of the West was ‘fundamentally 
indivisible’ and that for this reason some in the U.S. administration regretted the nuclear 
arrangements which existed with the UK.  ‘I was not in Washington in 1957 and 1958 when 
it was decided to reopen nuclear cooperation with the British,’ Bundy told Aron, ‘but my 
impression is that this decision grew out of the sense of political insecurity which followed 
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Sputnik.  We were then pressing upon NATO as a whole a kind of “forward strategy” in 
nuclear weapons, and the reinforcement of the British in the nuclear field must have seemed a 
logical part of this undertaking.  If we had to do it over again today, we should not encourage 
the British in this nuclear effort, and it is our guess that over a period of time all merely 
national deterrents in the hands of powers of the second rank will become uneconomic and 
ineffective.’  In other words, the Kennedy administration was having now to deal with the 
unwelcome legacy of the 1958 U.S./UK Agreement bequeathed to them by their 
predecessors, and would lose no sleep if it were to wither away.
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It was against this background of internal administration debate, and with Franco-
American relations running at low ebb, that McNamara made his Ann Arbor address in the 
middle of June 1962.  McNamara was to defend the Ann Arbor address as an attempt to 
‘educate’ America’s NATO allies in the finer points of nuclear strategy, and he clearly felt 
that it was necessary to reinforce the message of his ‘closed’ speech to NATO ministers at 
Athens with a public declaration of U.S. thinking that would also touch on recent arguments 
over nuclear assistance to France.  The final version of the address, it is apparent from the 
evidence, was toned down from the original draft.
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  Having provided an oral summary of its 
contents to the President, Bundy had told McNamara that Kennedy had some reservations, 
and that ‘it might seem to be a continuation of our debate with the French and might offer the 
Soviet Union a hand-hold for charges of missile rattling.’   The ‘easy way’ to handle the 
matter, Bundy advised Kennedy at the start of June, was ‘simply to say that this is not the 
right time for this particular speech.  Bob is a good soldier.’  The harder approach – and a 
more ‘sensitive operation’ - would be to revise the speech ‘with an eye on French sensibilities 
and Soviet propagandists.’  In the latter case, Bundy vouched he would be ‘glad to work with 
Bob’s people line by line and word by word.’58  Just over a week before its delivery, on 7 
June Bundy reported to the President that McNamara had revised the speech, and that he 
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thought it no longer constituted ‘a risk from the missile-rattling point of view,’ but the 
question remained of ‘whether the passage on weak national nuclear forces is desirable at this 
point in our messy dialogue with the French.’  Bundy was against inclusion, but McNamara 
had argued that it was needed ‘for a lot of people here [i.e. in Washington] and that it does 
not say anything directly disagreeable to the French themselves – they simply will not agree 
with it.’  In this instance, Kennedy chose to follow McNamara’s advice and the passage was 
included.
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  William Kaufmann, the RAND Corporation analyst and the principal author of 
McNamara’s Athens speech, was very much against the delivery of its unclassified 
counterpart at Ann Arbor, later recalling that in a top secret speech ‘there are a lot of things 
that you can say that you’re just crazy to say publicly, particularly the comments about the 
national nuclear deterrents of the British and the French.  I thought it was just crazy.’60 
 
Reactions to Ann Arbor 
 
Kaufmann’s sense of the wider ramifications of the speech was to prove accurate, and 
McNamara’s very public criticisms of small national nuclear forces had a deep and long-
lasting resonance.  As Macmillan later recalled, McNamara’s intervention at Ann Arbor 
‘could hardly have done anything more calculated to upset both his French and his British 
allies,’ while his ‘fervent denunciation of the dangers of the “dissemination of nuclear power” 
was an ill-disguised attack upon the determination both of Britain and of France to maintain, 
at any rate in the foreseeable future, their separate, independent nuclear forces.’61 
 The full extent of the Prime Minister’s annoyance can be appreciated by his anxiety 
that Washington’s approach to Alliance nuclear matters in the summer of 1962 could 
prejudice his overriding foreign policy objective of securing Britain’s entry into the EEC.     
At the start of June Macmillan had met de Gaulle at Champs in an attempt to lower French 
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opposition to British membership.
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  Before the meeting, Macmillan had discussed with the 
closest advisers whether he should suggest the idea of Anglo-French defence collaboration, 
including future possibilities in the nuclear field.  But, following the April visit to 
Washington, any initiative was inhibited by knowledge of likely U.S. disapproval, and 
ministers were also made nervous by recent press speculation that an Anglo-French nuclear 
deal might be in the offing.  The Prime Minister had even had to instruct the British 
Ambassador in Washington, Sir David Ormsby Gore, to inform Kennedy that there was no 
validity to such news stories and that he had ‘no intention of doing anything foolish at 
Champs.’63  In fact, at Champs, Macmillan had shared his personal thoughts with de Gaulle 
on the nuclear power of Britain and France being held for the benefit of European defence 
within NATO: ‘..if a European defence became a reality there might be an arrangement by 
which Europe, including the Germans, would control its own nuclear deterrent.’64 
He emerged from his meeting at Champs believing that he had made some headway, 
and that de Gaulle had a better idea that once Britain was in the EEC, it might, over the 
longer term, be possible to find a basis for some kind of nuclear collaboration.  This was what 
made Macmillan so annoyed about McNamara’s Ann Arbor speech with its attack on 
national nuclear forces, and the Kennedy administration’s renewed diplomatic push behind 
the MLF proposals.  According to the Prime Minister, McNamara’s remarks had been 
‘foolish’ and had ‘enraged the French’, putting the government in ‘difficulty’, which could 
only help the Labour Party in its attacks on the whole notion of an independent deterrent.
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Amongst the government’s erstwhile backers at home, moreover, there was particular 
irritation over McNamara’s Ann Arbor line that independent nuclear forces were ‘dangerous, 
expensive and prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent’.  The 
Conservative-supporting Daily Mail called it a ‘crippling blow’ at Britain’s independent 
deterrent and ‘marked the end of an era’ for the RAF’s Bomber Command as an independent 
29 
 
national force, while the Daily Express stressed the obvious divisions that had now opened 
between McNamara and Harold Watkinson, the British Minister of Defence.  There was even 
speculation that Watkinson might be forced to resign due to attacks which were bound to 
come from the Labour Party opposition on the government’s nuclear policy.66  Although 
more sober in its coverage, the defence correspondent of The Times noted that the new 
American counterforce strategy had as an essential corollary that  
the western nuclear effort must be unified and centrally coordinated.  There is no 
longer room for national nuclear deterrents which, if the enemy believes that they be 
used independently of the western alliance as a whole, are simply an invitation to the 
pre-emptive strike … In this context, Britain’s V-bomber force is clearly vulnerable, 
and the projected striking force of General de Gaulle will be even more open to such 
an attack in the early stages of its development.
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With a damaging story already current in The New Statesman alleging that his relations with 
McNamara had become deeply strained by Britain’s approach to conventional defence 
spending, an exasperated Watkinson advised the Prime Minister that although he was ‘quite 
sure that [the speech] was not aimed at us but at the French’, he thought it was ‘awkward and 
will be used by our critics against us.’  The Minister of Defence did not propose to respond 
publicly and he had instructed his press department ‘to do their best to calm it down.’  The 
dilemma of taking a clear public posture towards the speech’s content were plain, but his 
preference would be to side with the French and to seek to persuade the Americans to 
accept the French position for what, in fact, it is – that of a small highly inefficient 
nuclear power.  I am sure that the more McNamara or any other American attacks the 
French deterrent the more it makes the General and those around him absolutely 
determined to carry on with their current deterrent policy.  Do you think it would be 
any good saying this to the Americans and asking them if they could not manage to 
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accept what is, after all, the fact?  I do not necessarily believe this would encourage 
the Germans to do the same thing. 
It was not going to be easy, Watkinson thought, to ‘steer between the two conflicting policies 
of trying to be in agreement with the Americans and the French, particularly as I can see how 
much it is in our interests that we should not offend the French at this stage’. With Rusk 
shortly to arrive for a scheduled visit to the UK, Watkinson wanted the former to reply to the 
inevitable press questions ‘not that we were the good boys and the French the bad … but 
merely that Mr McNamara’s statement was on the lines of a policy that he and I had agreed 
together and one that we were indeed implementing because Bomber Command is targeted 
and integrated with Strategic Air Command.’68 
The Minister of Defence was technically correct in this last observation: since July 
1958 the two forces had operated a combined plan in the event of general nuclear war, and 
RAF officers had been based at Omaha with the U.S. Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff to 
ensure proper liaison with Strategic Air Command (SAC); there were also 60 Thor 
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) based in the UK which could be launched 
under ‘dual-key’ arrangements, and were integrated after they became operational during 
1959 with Anglo-American joint target planning.  By 1962, the coordinated Anglo-American 
plan would have involved the V-bomber force and Thors in attacks against the Soviet Union 
on 16 cities, 44 airfields, 10 air defense control centers, and 28 IRBM sites.  However, there 
was also in existence a UK national plan for the use of the V-bomber force alone, informed 
by its own criteria of target selection.  The guidelines for this plan had first been promulgated 
by the British Chiefs of Staff in October 1957, and it was avowedly countervalue in nature, 
with major Soviet centers of population the only targets.
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 In a bid to deflect further embarrassing probes, Lord Home, the Foreign Secretary, 
took up Watkinson’s suggestion of a direct appeal to Rusk.  The latter was told that the Ann 
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Arbor speech was likely to ‘give rise to strong attacks by the [Labour Party] Opposition on 
our policy of maintaining our contribution to the Western nuclear deterrent.  In fact, the 
Opposition are likely to be elated with this opportunity.’  If criticised in the House of 
Commons, the Foreign Secretary warned Rusk, ministers ‘shall have to hit back and some 
hard things will have to be said.’ Divergences between U.S. and British approaches to 
deterrent policy might have to be revealed and ‘thrashed out’ in public on the floor of the 
House.  There was ‘much to be said in our own and American interests for taking the heat out 
of debates on this issue if possible.’70 
The line the British government chose to propound was that McNamara, with his 
criticism of independently operating nuclear forces, was not in fact referring to the British 
strategic deterrent as Bomber Command worked according to an agreed and coordinated joint 
target plan with SAC.  The unattributed briefing material disseminated by the Foreign Office 
was even more explicit: the strategic role of the V-bomber force ‘in support of NATO’ was 
‘fully integrated’ with that of the U.S. strategic air force and its ‘assigned targets are part of a 
unified plan.’  The government had ‘never conceived’ of the V-force ‘as contributing to 
anything in the nature of a third force’.71  Nevertheless, critical comment continued, including 
a BBC television news report and commentary which Watkinson found so tendentious that he 
felt compelled to write a letter of protest to the BBC’s director-general, Hugh Carleton 
Green.
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McNamara had been made aware of the UK press fallout from his Ann Arbor speech 
very soon after its delivery.  Public relations officials in the Department of Defense’s Office 
of International Security Affairs quickly spread the word that the Pentagon was unhappy with 
the interpretation being given to McNamara’s remarks, and that the phrase ‘operating 
independently’ clearly excluded Britain from his criticism, ‘as that country does not operate 
independently.’  British correspondents in Washington were said to understand the technical 
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point, but that other interpretations were ‘difficult to stop in the political attacks which 
“Labour” is trying to make against Watkinson’s nuclear forces.’  Further statements from 
McNamara were not expected to have much effect, but might be necessary to assuage any 
grievance felt by Watkinson.
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 Efforts at damage limitation continued.  U.S. Department of 
Defense spokesmen, when questioned in Washington, duly repeated the British official line, 
and were ready to add that ‘control’ of the force remained in the hands of the UK. 74 
This all represented an unwelcome distraction, however, from the British 
government’s prevailing concerns over how to lower French opposition to British entry into 
the European Community.  Ormsby Gore took an early chance to see McNamara in 
Washington where he explained, as he reported to the Foreign Office, that 
in the coming weeks we would find ourselves in a very delicate situation over our 
negotiations to enter the Common Market.  It was not therefore in our interest to have 
to point out all the time the differences between our position over nuclear weapons 
and that of France.  I was afraid that on this occasion his lucidity of mind and clarity 
of expression had proved something of an embarrassment to us. 
McNamara understood, but wanted to underline to Ormsby Gore his eagerness to undertake 
for the NATO allies ‘a process of education’ in the realities of the nuclear world and the 
choices in nuclear strategy that confronted the United States, of which his recent 
pronouncements had been a key part.  At the close of their conversation, McNamara 
professed that he was ‘very sorry for any difficulties’ which his Ann Arbor speech had 
caused, and that he was ‘extremely anxious to maintain very good and close relations with the 
British Government and he hoped that the excitement would soon die down.’75 
Unfortunately it refused to do so.  In the New York Herald Tribune, Walter Lippmann 
produced a column which claimed that the UK force could never be used independently and 
that the last word on its employment would always lie with President Kennedy.  This was 
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story which caught the Prime Minister’s eye prompting him to send a curt message to 
Watkinson: ‘As I see it, legally, the President can use the American deterrent without my 
agreement.  I can use the British deterrent without his approval.  We have a gentleman’s 
agreement to consult each other “if there is time to do so”.  All that is being said to the 
contrary is just anti-British propaganda.’76 
In fact, Watkinson had already been busy with a further effort to kill the controversy 
once and for all by giving an interview to the defence correspondent of The Times on 22 June, 
where the position was affirmed that Britain had the ‘unchallenged right to use its nuclear 
force independently or to withhold its use if the Government think it right to do so.’   He 
explained that while Bomber Command’s target plans were ‘completely integrated’ with 
those of SAC, Britain had the ‘political freedom’ to withdraw the force for ‘national 
purposes,’ but added his opinion that this would make ‘no military sense at all in the present 
state of Anglo-American relations.’  Watkinson went on to assure the correspondent – less 
than accurately - that ‘all the implications’ of the Ann Arbor speech had been discussed 
between himself and McNamara before it was made, and that the government was in full 
agreement with the ‘broad outlines’ of U.S. strategic thought.  To suggest that British nuclear 
targets in the coordinated plans with SAC were ‘centres of population’ was ‘quite wrong’, 
although there ‘might well be many cases where it would be difficult to distinguish between 
military and civilian targets.’    American belief in the value of the UK force, Watkinson 
argued, had been demonstrated by the assurances he had recently received from McNamara 
that Skybolt was being developed according to plan.  Nevertheless, whatever the ‘official’ 
British position, The Times’ correspondent was adamant that the effect of the Ann Arbor 
speech was to bring the British nuclear force ‘firmly into the centre of the political scene’ and 
that whether he meant it or not, McNamara’s comments on small independent deterrents 
applied ‘as forcibly to the British deterrent as any other.’77 
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A day later, goaded by his interview with Ormsby Gore, McNamara issued a 
statement which clarified that his Ann Arbor remarks referred to the dangers of separate 
nuclear capabilities operating independently.  As Bomber Command’s aircraft were 
organised as part of a coordinated Anglo-American force alongside SAC, this clearly did not 
apply in the UK case, ‘although of course their political control remains with the British 
Government.’  He had not been referring to the British force at Ann Arbor, McNamara 
reiterated, adding that the U.S. ‘appreciate[s] the important role’ which the British force 
played in joint strike plans.
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In one further Department of Defense effort to clarify matters, Adam Yarmolinsky, 
who played an important role in adapting McNamara’s presentation in Athens for public 
delivery at Ann Arbor, gave an interview to a Washington Post correspondent at the end of 
June.  In Yarmolinsky’s view, press reporting of the Ann Arbor speech had not given 
sufficient attention to its final third which made clear the U.S. would regard nuclear war as a 
‘wholly unprecedented disaster, even with a “no-city” strategy’ and as a consequence the 
main emphasis of the administration was on increasing the Alliance’s conventional strength.  
He also said that, ‘We were not thinking of the British in the speech.  On the other hand, we 
would be unhappy if the British were to fail to build-up their conventional forces on the 
grounds that they needed the money for their nuclear deterrent or that their nuclear deterrent 
was all they needed.’  Asked why the administration did not offer some assistance to France 
in the hope that this would provide some degree of control, Yarmolinsky replied that 
decisions over the control of their weapons were ‘too important for the French to be much 
influenced by whether we belatedly helped them or not.  And helping them would encourage 
other nations to assume that they too could go ahead and then get American help.’79 
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Kennedy’s ‘Eight Questions’: McNamara and Britain’s Nuclear Independence 
 
What was McNamara’s underlying thinking at this time on the central question of 
independent European nuclear capabilities, and how did this relate to the Kennedy 
administration’s earlier internal debates over the issue of possible U.S. nuclear assistance to 
France?  Recently released documents from the U.S. side now help to provide further insight 
on the background to the Ann Arbor speech and these key questions.  On 25 May 1962, only 
eight days after the press conference in which he had publicly decried the tendency toward a 
proliferation of national or independent deterrents, Kennedy addressed a memorandum to 
Rusk and McNamara which asked if several presumptions on which current U.S. policy was 
based should be reexamined.   Kennedy went on to pose eight sets of questions which 
encapsulated his concerns.  He asked whether, in fact, offering nuclear information to France 
would encourage a similar wish amongst the Germans, and if an arrangement could be made 
with the French which would limit German demands; whether refusing to give assistance to 
France would push the French towards the Germans ‘thus making German possession more 
likely’; whether British entry into the EEC would not, in any case, bring France into ‘nuclear 
discussions’; if the U.S. presumption that French support (perhaps post-de Gaulle) for a 
European deterrent could ultimately be secured now looked ever-more unlikely; since French 
generation of a nuclear capability now seeming inevitable, when this materialised would it 
mean the French have ‘no obligation to us, and that we will lack the element of control that 
our cooperation with the British has given us’; was not the ‘NATO nuclear concept … still 
born – really not developing in any way and no longer a likely prospect’; would helping 
France really stimulate demands from other countries to follow a similar path (and did refusal 
to offer assistance  discourage proliferation); and finally, with the conventional strength of 
the European members of NATO still limited, was implementation of the Alliance’s ‘forward 
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strategy’ going to be possible, and if not, ‘should we consider whether it is possible for us to 
reduce our forces in the European theatre’?80   
This was an extensive list of queries and went to the heart of the debates between the 
so-called ‘young Turks’ in the State Department, led by George Ball, who saw creation of the 
MLF and strong moves against independent national nuclear forces as the best answer to the 
nuclear problems of the Western Alliance, and a more sceptical Pentagon view.  It also 
showed the Kennedy’s mind was more open to discussion within his administration on this 
key issue than the April meeting that had led to his NSAM 148 directives had tended to 
imply, and his recent press conference pronouncements, had suggested.   Prepared in Nitze’s 
office for International Security Affairs, McNamara’s reply to Kennedy’s ‘eight questions’ 
memorandum was provided on 16 June, the same day as he gave the Ann Arbor address.  In 
this long paper, McNamara began by arguing that U.S. non-cooperation was not going to 
bring the French nuclear program to an end, which was virtually certain to be continued even 
after de Gaulle had left the scene.  But once an initial (and minimal) French force was 
deployed, French ambitions should be influenced by U.S. efforts to bring them to understand 
the ‘political and military limitations of a weak, independent nuclear force’.  It should be an 
American aim to limit the size of the French program, and ‘link it increasingly to our own 
U.S. nuclear forces’, perhaps through coordinated planning, and eventually involvement in an 
MLF closely tied to NATO.   Such changes in French approaches would not be easy to 
achieve, however, and if a shift in U.S. policy toward acceptance of a French program, or 
even assistance to it, were forthcoming it might stimulate unwelcome expectations in both 
France itself and Germany. 
In any case,’ the paper maintained, ‘the continuation of a vigorous, if modest, French 
program would undoubtedly generate pressures within Germany over time for an 
independent German force, unless the political unification of Europe moves faster 
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than now seems likely.  Moreover, an additional motive for a German program may 
exist as compared with the British and French; the desire to strengthen its bargaining 
position vis-à-vis the USSR over reunification and Berlin.  The Germans might be 
prepared to forego nuclear independence as part of a larger deal on unification.  But 
for this leverage to be effective they would have to have the nuclear option open to 
them. 
Over time, it was believed, the Germans might come to regard the French and British nuclear 
forces as becoming the core of a new ‘European’ force, so that Bonn’s feelings of 
discriminatory treatment might abate, but this could not be taken for granted.  An American 
offer of nuclear assistance to France would probably lead to cooperation in areas such as 
targeting.  But if the French program were to receive U.S. help, it was bound to stimulate 
calls in the longer term (perhaps 3-5 years) for similar treatment from Germany.  Feelings of 
discrimination could become even more acute if the U.S. and Soviet Union were to reach a 
non-proliferation agreement, not least as it would be seen as largely directed against 
Germany.  If nuclear help to France were refused, the French might, McNamara conjectured, 
turn to Germany for financial support, with the long-term inducement of a share in French 
nuclear capabilities through European defence planning (it was seen as unlikely that de 
Gaulle would want to do anything that could lead to actual German possession of nuclear 
weapons). 
 On the question of Anglo-French nuclear relations developing onto a new plane as a 
result of Britain’s eventual membership of the EEC, it was felt that French opinion would 
find it unacceptable for there to be a differential in the U.S.-UK and French-UK nuclear 
relationship if the UK managed to join the Community.  It was this issue that gave 
McNamara reason to compare the fundamental qualities of the relations that Washington 
enjoyed with the two West European allies: 
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To us there is a clear distinction between our relationships with the UK and our 
relationships with France.  Except for several short-lived episodes, such as the 
abortive Suez affair, British foreign policy for a century [sic] has rested on the 
proposition that it cannot afford a fundamental split with the U.S.  This drawing 
together has become far more explicit in recent times in view of the over-riding 
importance the British attach to the American Alliance.  The British have accepted the 
status of junior partner in the firm in exchange for a special relationship which they 
believe affords them a unique opportunity to influence U.S. policy. 
The British had forged their post-war nuclear policy in this political context, and were now 
reaping the benefits to the revision of U.S. atomic energy legislation in 1958 that permitted 
the transfer of highly-sensitive U.S. weapons information to the UK authorities.  This had 
allowed the British for ‘relatively small expenditure’ to gain nuclear warhead technology 
which on qualitative terms was on a level with American, while ‘The possession of the 
Bomber Command [sic] has seemed to the British to be an important factor in giving the 
British the second place in the eyes of world opinion in the councils of the Free World.’  The 
advantages of the 1958 deal for the UK were manifold: they could buy from the U.S. or make 
as much nuclear material as they could afford; there were no restrictions on the size of their 
technical and scientific nuclear weapons establishment, or the nature of their research 
program; or the number and type of nuclear systems they chose to field.  Except for data on 
gaseous diffusion techniques for uranium enrichment, the UK was 
privy to virtually every U.S. development in the nuclear weapons field.  They had the 
run of almost every U.S. research institution; access to a large part of U.S. intelligence 
data; and they could, if they chose to do so, construct almost any one of the U.S. 
weapon designs.  In addition, they are able to exchange their surplus of plutonium for 
American U-235 [under a barter arrangement reached in May 1959].  That they 
39 
 
choose not to apply much of this sharing information to development of their own 
weapon systems is due to their own policy decisions and not to any control exercised 
by the U.S. 
As for the level of independence that the British were able to enjoy, McNamara felt it 
would be ‘difficult to contend that the U.S. controls the British nuclear program in the sense 
that we make, or influence, the British to do things to which they really object.  Rather, the 
more reasonable interpretation is that the harmonization of their nuclear policy with that of 
the U.S. caused them no pain, and that the atomic assistance received from the U.S. has been 
sheer profit.’  At the same time McNamara recognised that the UK had had to play a price for 
this special nuclear relationship with the U.S., including accommodating a number of 
American facilities on UK soil – including Polaris submarine berthing facilities at Holy Loch 
in Scotland - which had created occasional political problems at home, and showing 
cooperation over several colonial issues. 
McNamara stressed the different quality of Franco-American to Anglo-American 
relations, and the way this influenced nuclear matters.  ‘We lack the long experience of close 
partnership,’ he noted.  ‘Not only de Gaulle’s ideas, but French ideas generally are not easily 
assimilable [sic] to our ideas.’  The French under de Gaulle were ‘determined to re-establish a 
political position they had not had for generations.’  France’s recent negative attitudes toward 
NATO and the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil did not auger well for the future: 
there was not a ‘firm and well-established foundation of mutual confidence and trust which 
would seem to be essential for an activity so delicate and important as nuclear sharing.’  
Unlike de Gaulle, the British had been ‘willing to live within the nuclear policy favored by 
the U.S., and they have done so without having to sign any written commitments to this effect 
beyond the [1958] arrangement not to retransmit data and atomic materials.  On the other 
hand, there is reason to believe that de Gaulle is unwilling similarly to restrict his policy 
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options whether the pledge would be written or unwritten.’  As far as McNamara was 
concerned, ‘the British have not surrendered their independence, however little it may be 
worth.  And the French are no more likely to.  Finally, since the U.S. is the great nuclear 
power, the French have every incentive to seek coordination with us whether or not we assist 
them rather than the other way around.  The problem to be overcome is de Gaulle’s sense of 
pride.’ 
As to the prospect of the French eventually subscribing to a ‘European’ deterrent 
force, rather than one centered on NATO (and so subject to a U.S. veto), McNamara argued 
that while de Gaulle was opposed to multilateral arrangements, broader French opinion was 
more sympathetic.  ‘There is an inherent inconsistency,’ it was maintained, ‘in an 
independent French national nuclear deterrent and a European Community gaining depth in 
the political and economic fields.’  Without giving up the right of independent action in the 
event of an emergency, a post-de Gaulle leadership might well find the idea of a European 
deterrent attractive, but this would pose difficulties for the nuclear arrangements of the 
NATO Alliance and bear on the nature of the U.S. commitment to Europe’s defence.  ‘The 
French, and the other Europeans,’ McNamara opined, ‘are still in the elementary stages of 
learning about nuclear warfare.  It would appear to be in the U.S. interest and that of the West 
generally that education and action make possible a NATO-wide solution to the problem 
rather than a division between a U.S. deterrent and a European deterrent.  In the end, if we 
handle ourselves intelligently, Europe and the French should come out strongly in favor of 
close association with the U.S. on nuclear matters.’81 McNamara’s response to President 
Kennedy’s ‘eight questions’ memorandum provided an essential counterpoint to his Ann 
Arbor address, and reflected growing scepticism within the Department of Defense that there 
existed immediate and worthwhile avenues for nuclear cooperation with France, especially 
now that the Kennedy administration was re-doubling its efforts to promote the MLF. 
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The Aftermath of Ann Arbor 
 
Less than a week after Ann Arbor, Rusk had talks in Paris with de Gaulle and other senior 
French officials amid continuing hostile press coverage of McNamara’s speech, which was 
being seen as ‘a brutally frank restatement of the Washington belief that Europe’s job in the 
Western alliance is to provide foot soldiers and leave the nuclear capability to the United 
States.’82  The emollient French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, told Rusk that 
like the British, a French nuclear force might eventually have combined targeting with the 
Americans but still enjoy ultimate independent control.  He added, moreover, that 
In the theoretical event of the Continent being overrun by Russian conventional forces 
and the Americans at that point not having made use of their nuclear arms, he thought 
it conceivable that the British might then use theirs independently.  There was no 
question of the French force being used independently except in the very last resort. 
When asked by Rusk if this meant the force de frappe would be used to trigger an American 
nuclear response, Couve simply replied that ‘they would not be so silly.83 
Later, Rusk tried to impress on de Gaulle the point that national nuclear forces would 
be unnecessary under the collective cover of NATO, especially as the Alliance moved to 
improve its procedures over nuclear consultation.  ‘If there are nuclear forces within the 
Alliance which might move separately,’ Rusk had said, ‘then we are faced with a whole 
series of most difficult problems.  Defense in NATO must be indivisible.  We must act 
together.  It is impossible for us to act separately.  There are delicate problems of common 
action but this is fundamental.’  But the French President remained profoundly unconvinced, 
believing that no-one could be sure what would happen in the future in the event of a Soviet 
attack, which could fall on a variety of different points in Europe.  What Rusk pictured as 
‘indivisibility’ between Alliance members seemed to de Gaulle to ‘amount to integration 
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which meant American control.  For the French this no longer corresponded to what is 
necessary.’84  
Rusk’s Parisian foray did little to endear recent U.S. diplomacy to British officials.  
At Champs, Macmillan had tried to emphasise to de Gaulle that Britain enjoyed genuine 
nuclear independence from the United States, but such reassurances had been undercut by the 
British responses that had been issued in the wake of McNamara’s Ann Arbor speech.   The 
clarifying statements that stressed the integration of Anglo-American nuclear forces 
counteracted the overall impression that the Prime Minister had set out to achieve as the 
backdrop to the talks over EEC entry, which were due to resume in the autumn of 1962.  
Press reports from London, for example, drew attention to the point that Macmillan had 
publicly emphasised the political importance of an independent deterrent, but then quoted 
‘qualified sources’ as saying that the close integration of the UK force with the U.S. 
command and warning system meant that independent action was in practice ‘virtually out of 
the question.’85  From Washington, the head of the British Defence Staff thought there was a 
danger of the government opening itself up to the charge of ‘schizophrenia’ by on the one 
hand implying complete political independence over the UK force, but on the other 
emphasising ‘complete operational integration.’86   
The fact that Rusk, returning via London from his trip to Paris and other European 
capitals, had then tried to elicit British support for the MLF incurred further prime ministerial 
criticism.  Macmillan complained to the Foreign Secretary in one minute: 
If we cannot persuade the Americans to keep quiet about the Common Market, I 
would hope that we could at least impress on Rusk the importance of leaving the 
nuclear question, and indeed the re-organisation of NATO, until the negotiations with 
the Six [EEC members] have come to a head.  In the nuclear field, we have an 
independent deterrent and the French are going to get one; these are facts which the 
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Americans cannot alter.  There is therefore no point in their going on talking about 
them; the moment to take stock will come quite soon after our talks with the Six have 
ended.
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Having to lay stress on the integrated nature of Anglo-American nuclear planning as a retort 
to criticism of independent nuclear forces clearly did not help to allay de Gaulle’s suspicions 
of Britain’s enduring ties with the Americans.88   
But the U.S. Secretary of State was unrepentant, and was now determined to pursue 
the MLF agenda.  When passing through London on 25 June, Rusk had held meetings with 
Home and other senior Foreign Office officials.   He told them that his main anxiety was that 
‘the Germans would, sooner or later, seek to have a nuclear capacity of their own unless they 
were offered some alternative arrangement such as the multilateral force.’  There was a need, 
he argued, to move the talks on the MLF within NATO forward ‘with all deliberate speed’, 
and ‘he was not asking [the UK] to agree with the American position but simply that we 
should not frustrate the exercise.’  Home’s response was to assure Rusk that the British would 
not try to prevent the issues being discussed in NATO, but he hoped that the political 
problems, as opposed to the military need for an MRBM force, could be reserved for later 
discussion.
89
 Later that same day, Rusk resumed discussion with Home at the U.S. Embassy, 
where he turned British attention to the problem of coordinating statements to the press, and 
when confronted by parliamentary questions, over the position of the UK deterrent.  Rusk 
expressed ‘some concern’ that a British draft statement underlined the fact that, even though 
this might be a remote contingency, the British deterrent was available for independent use.  
After some discussion of alternative language, Rusk treated British officials to his own 
scepticism over the whole notion of nuclear independence, saying: 
 …the employment of nuclear weapons is not a path to freedom but a path to slavery.  
The U.S. has never had less independence than it has today in the areas affected by 
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these weapons.  We do not talk of the independent use of nuclear weapons because of 
our many Allies.  The responsibility which the possession of these weapons brings 
inhibits our freedom of action.  This is an aspect of the situation which the French 
tend to overlook.  He thought of the U.S.-UK relationship as something which goes 
back to World War II.  The UK nuclear capability is one of its contributions to the 
Alliance. 
No NATO ally, Rusk said, ‘would expect to act independently’ when it came to nuclear use, 
and the U.S. looked on its own weapons as a contribution to the Alliance.  The French 
attitude, by contrast, seemed to be to emphasise that a national nuclear capability was 
associated with non-cooperation, but ‘this was not a problem with the UK.’  His next 
comment touched at the raw nerves of the whole rationale for why the UK would even 
consider possessing an independent nuclear force: ‘the more the UK stressed its 
independence the more it tended to move in our independence.’  Rusk then ‘cited the 
theoretical problem with which Khrushchev and President Kennedy would be confronted if 
missiles should be fired from the UK at the Soviet Union.’90 
 Meanwhile, the government’s discomfort – this time on the parliamentary home front 
– continued.   On 26 June several Labour MPs, reacting in part to the repeated attacks in the 
past by the Conservatives for their Party’s allegedly incoherent approach to Britain’s nuclear 
future, took the opportunity to quiz Macmillan very closely in the House of Commons on 
where the government’s nuclear policy now stood.  The Prime Minister began with the 
statement that the government was ‘constitutionally free to determine upon the use of this 
power.’  At the same time, there had been ‘there has been joint planning between the British 
and American authorities against any future emergency.  What may be the ultimate 
development of European defence is a matter for consideration with changing circumstances.’  
However, Harold Wilson, Labour’s foreign affairs spokesman, for one, was not satisfied, and 
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referred to the fact that as a result of recent clarifying pronouncements, both the British and 
American governments seemed to have condemned ‘the idea of independent deterrents which 
are capable of operating independently’, and asked whether the Prime Minister if it was still 
government policy to have such a force.  Refuting Wilson’s interpretation, the Prime Minister 
ploughed on by saying, 
It is for us to decide what we are to do.  We have to recognize – and do recognize – 
that France is now a nuclear power, and is likely to remain one.  There are great 
problems which can be discussed as to the future.  For the present, we have this 
independent deterrent … [and] there are very strong reasons for maintaining it, and 
we intend to do so. 
This was not sufficient, though, to prevent further probing about how the UK force could 
operate independently when it was ‘integrated’ with that of the U.S. for planning purposes, 
and so presumably could not be used without American approval.   Again, Macmillan had to 
try to explain that ‘although in practice the targets are discussed and arranged between us’, 
the force itself was under complete national control: ‘the sovereignty, the power of control, 
rests with Her Majesty’s Ministers for the time being, and the officers concerned would 
follow the instructions given to them by the Government of the day.’ 
Seizing on the contradictions that seemed to lie within the Prime Minister’s argument, 
Hugh Gaitskell, the Labour Party’s leader, then raised the inconsistency between 
McNamara’s recent remarks and the government’s position, saying, ‘If the British 
Government are free, as I understand he claims, to use the nuclear deterrent as they wish, 
how can this possibly be reconciled with Mr. McNamara's position?’  All Macmillan could 
reply was he was ‘not responsible for what Mr McNamara may have said’ and that there 
remained strong reasons for retaining a deterrent under national control.  ‘As a matter of 
practice,’ the Prime Minister confirmed, ‘there is an understanding which I had with 
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President Eisenhower and now have with President Kennedy that neither of us in any part of 
the world would think of using power of this kind without consultation with each other; but 
that does not take away the independent right of both the American and the British 
Government.’91 
 
Skybolt Cancellation and the Nassau Agreement 
 
By July 1962, much to the relief of British officials, the controversy over McNamara’s 
remarks over national deterrents began to dissipate.  Ministers in London were still banking 
on the arrival in service of the Skybolt missile system during the second half of the 1960s to 
give the V-bomber force some credibility to penetrate Soviet air defences, and did not 
anticipate having to make difficult decisions over the provision of a successor system for the 
deterrent for at least another two years.  That same month also saw Peter Thorneycroft 
replace Watkinson as British Minister of Defence, and it was Thorneycroft who travelled to 
the United States in September 1962 where he heard first hand complaints from McNamara 
over Skybolt’s steadily rising costs.  Yet no mention was made by the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense of any reconsideration of the program (despite the fact that he was by now leaning 
toward cancellation).
92
  In a further attempt to dispel any lingering doubts following his Ann 
Arbor speech, McNamara made clear that the United States considered that British 
possession of a national deterrent force was of a different character to that of France because 
in the former case ‘independent political control coupled with integrated targeting was 
tolerable to the United States because of basic identity of political outlook and aims and 
because we understood each other well.  These could not be taken for granted by the United 
States in the case of France.’93  
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The upbeat report with which Thorneycroft returned from Washington might have 
been qualified if he had been aware of the State Department’s increasingly firm conviction 
that positive steps should be taken to scale back the extent of Anglo-American nuclear 
cooperation.
94
  Echoing the advice he had received from Kohler in May 1962, a few days 
before the Thorneycroft visit Rusk had written to McNamara to remind him of the importance 
of the April 1961 Policy Directive on the long-term future of the British deterrent.  When the 
current negotiations on British EEC entry were concluded, he explained, it would be 
necessary to re-examine the special UK-U.S. nuclear relationship, in the context of U.S. 
desires ‘that future European nuclear efforts are based on genuinely multilateral rather than 
national programs.’  Before this exercise was conducted, the Secretary of State believed it 
was ‘of the utmost importance to avoid any actions to expand the relationship.  Such actions 
could seriously prejudice future decisions and developments and make more difficult the 
working out of sound multilateral arrangements.’  Rusk expressed his confidence that 
McNamara understood any moves by the UK to acquire Polaris or similar systems as a 
successor to the V-bomber force were to be avoided, and that ‘U.S. decisions relative to 
Skybolt should be made on the basis solely of U.S. interest in this missile for our own forces.’ 
Rusk argued that holding to this posture would be important because the UK was 
probably considering its future nuclear options once it had entered the EEC and that a 
European deterrent force would have to be based on missiles rather than manned bombers.  
Previous British interest in Polaris, it was conjectured, might be revived, in an effort to 
perpetuate a UK national force which could then be combined with the French under joint 
arrangements.  Rusk did not see Macmillan’s idea for an eventual Anglo-French nuclear 
deterrent, held in trust for Europe, as holding any attractions for the United States, since it 
would do nothing to defuse German ambitions.   U.S. willingness to supply Polaris to Britain 
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without tying it to genuinely multilateral arrangements, he felt, could influence the UK to 
turn in a direction inimical to the wider goals of U.S. European policy.
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This political advice – with the State Department maintaining that there should be no 
special regard for Britain’s position when it came to decisions over Skybolt’s future – was of 
obvious significance when on 7 November, with Kennedy administration officials relaxing in 
the afterglow of their performance during the Cuban missile crisis, McNamara came forward 
with the recommendation that the Skybolt program should be cancelled on cost grounds.  It 
was recognised by senior Pentagon and White House officials that cancellation would 
represent a serious political blow to Macmillan’s government, and possibly even lead to its 
fall, an eventuality which no-one wanted to see.  The British would have to be informed that 
cancellation was likely and be given time to decide what to propose before the administration 
made its final recommendation on the defense budget towards the end of the month.
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When informed by McNamara by telephone that cancellation was under 
consideration, Thorneycroft made clear the seriousness of the position if the decision was to 
be confirmed, pointing to the vulnerability of the government to criticism from its own 
erstwhile backbench Conservative supporters.
97
  While McNamara had seemed prepared to 
hint to Thorneycroft that Polaris might indeed be substituted for Skybolt, this was not a 
proposition that found any support in the State Department.  On 24 November, in fact, Rusk 
wrote to McNamara to make it plain that the State Department would be adamantly opposed 
to any such move.  Instead, Rusk put forward three alternatives: Britain to continue with 
Skybolt development and production (with U.S. financial and technical assistance); provision 
of Hound Dog missiles for use with the V-bomber force; and participation in a sea-based 
NATO MRBM force, with mixed-manning of surface ships.  ‘It seems essential,’ Rusk had 
stressed, ‘that we make quite clear to the British that there is no possibility of our helping 
them set up a nationally manned and owned MRBM force.’98  What is surprising in retrospect 
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was how little objection was made by McNamara to the State Department’s position, 
especially as it contained no explicit mention of Polaris by name.
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 The wider significance of McNamara’s Ann Arbor speech was now to become clear, 
as it served to intensify and confirm British suspicions that Skybolt cancellation had more 
behind it than simply the Pentagon’s concerns over rising costs.  When McNamara finally 
made his way to London to meet Thorneycroft face-to-face on 11 December – having told 
waiting reporters on his arrival at Gatwick airport that Skybolt had serious technical problems 
– their meeting at the Ministry of Defence was a tense affair.   Thorneycroft’s response to the 
conditional offer of Polaris tied into an MLF package was that the two subjects should not be 
linked: it would be ‘impossible’ to combine any statement of the U.S. agreement to provide 
Polaris with a British commitment to join a multilateral force, as ‘no-one would believe that 
the choice had in fact been free.  The test of the independence of a nuclear deterrent was 
whether, like the V-bomber/Skybolt force, it would be operable entirely on its own.’100 The 
U.S. record of this encounter had Thorneycroft stressing that Skybolt cancellation would be 
used by the government’s critics to underline American unreliability, with the impression 
made much worse by the lingering effects of the Ann Arbor speech.  The British press would 
say, the Minister of Defence complained, that the Skybolt decision formed part of a policy 
which had been formulated earlier in the year by the Kennedy administration: ‘They will say 
that this decision is really taken to force Britain out of having an independent nuclear 
deterrent.’101 
The complicated and intense negotiations that ensued at Nassau from 19-21 
December 1962 eventually saw a compromise of sorts emerge.
102
  With Kennedy 
acknowledging that the original 1960 agreement to provide Skybolt did amount to some 
obligation on the United States to offer a replacement, and with the President not wanting to 
see Macmillan’s domestic political position completely undermined to Labour’s advantage, 
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the Americans agreed to supply Polaris.  But the missile system was only offered in the 
context of an involved and ambiguous set of undertakings that it should form part of 
collective Alliance arrangements (both powers, it was agreed would look toward ‘the 
development of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with our NATO 
allies’ and would ‘use their best endeavours to this end.’)  While prepared to study the 
multilateral principle, Macmillan insisted that Britain must retain the right to independent use 
of the weapon system when ‘supreme national interests’ were invoked by the government, 
and this crucial clause was inserted in the final Nassau communique.
103
  
The Skybolt crisis with its culmination at the Nassau Conference had served to 
remind U.S. officials that maintenance of some form of ‘independent’ nuclear capability – 
where a national firing chain could operate – was a very sensitive domestic political subject 
for British ministers, and that cajoling or even forcing the British into renouncing their 
national deterrent capability would almost certainly do fundamental damage to Anglo-
American relations and so prejudice certain basic objectives in U.S. foreign and defence 
policy.  Over the next eighteen months, much against its basic inclinations, the British 
government continued to express polite interest in American plans for creation of an MLF.  
While harbouring the deepest private reservations, they took part in discussions over the 
practicalities of the scheme, all the while hoping to drag out the talks so that opposition 
within Western Europe would develop and the Americans would lose enthusiasm.
104
  In fact, 
within the Kennedy administration, and its successor, scepticism over the MLF was also rife, 
running from the White House through to the Pentagon.  Only the imperative need to stifle 
German nuclear ambitions kept the scheme alive, while both Kennedy and later President 
Lyndon Johnson were insistent that it could not be introduced except with European 
agreement.
105
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 In the meantime, of course, the contours of transatlantic and Alliance relations had 
been shaken by de Gaulle’s veto of Britain’s entry into the EEC, issued in the wake of the 
Nassau agreement.  During his famous press conference announcement of the veto on 14 
January 1963, de Gaulle had cited the Agreement as evidence that Britain was tied into a 
cycle of nuclear dependence on the United States and so could not be relied upon to adopt a 
suitably European or independent attitude to global problems.
106
  In private, at the start of 
January, de Gaulle had in fact already rejected a parallel offer to the Nassau Agreement from 
Kennedy which would have involved U.S. provision of Polaris in return for subscribing 
French nuclear forces to an MLF.
107
  This was precisely the kind of compromise that had 
been considered and turned down when Rusk had visited Paris in June 1962 in the days 
following McNamara’s attack on national nuclear forces at Ann Arbor.  Integration of nuclear 
planning, in French eyes, denoted U.S. control.     
 
‘Moments of Great National Peril’: The Ambiguities of British Nuclear Independence 
 
It was the French appreciation of the implications of joint planning that helped to create a 
diplomatic and public relations tangle for the British government in the immediate aftermath 
of the Ann Arbor speech.  Keen to distance themselves from McNamara’s blanket 
denunciation of national nuclear forces, British ministers and officials had emphasised that 
there was close Anglo-American integration of nuclear planning, even though ultimate 
national control was still exercised over the British force.  But this latter aspect of the 
clarifications and explanations that were promulgated after Ann Arbor tended to be obscured 
by the admission that combined, operational nuclear planning was well-entrenched between 
Bomber Command and SAC.  The British parliamentary exchanges in late June 1962 
underlined the essential point that just when the requirements of British diplomacy toward 
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EEC entry demanded that ministers should assert the element of independence in nuclear 
policy – in order to convince de Gaulle that Britain could free itself of its close links to the 
U.S. - McNamara’s speech pushed them into trying to unravel, in none too convincing terms, 
the contradictions that seemed to lie at the heart of UK nuclear policy.   
The UK certainly maintained national nuclear target planning throughout this period, 
but the chief emphasis of Bomber Command after 1958 had been on its combined planning 
with SAC.  In May 1963, under the Nassau Agreement, these arrangements were changed 
when the entire UK V-bomber force was ‘assigned’ to the U.S. Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe for targeting purposes and it was SACEUR’s nuclear planning cell at Omaha – with 
British officers attached - that now coordinated its work with that of SAC.
108
  As 
McNamara’s private views at the time of the Ann Arbor speech make clear, as long as UK 
strategic nuclear forces had joint planning arrangements which allowed them to operate 
alongside and in harmony with U.S. forces, he did not see a problem with providing U.S. 
nuclear assistance to the UK.  It was nuclear forces which operated independently which 
were the principal cause for concern if counterforce targeting doctrine were to be 
implemented.  Britain not only had a common Cold War outlook to the United States, he 
reasoned, but had clearly reconciled itself to the role of junior nuclear partner.  And within 
these arrangements, it would seem, the Americans did not rate the capabilities of the British 
V-bomber force very highly.  During one interview with McNamara in July 1962, Ormsby 
Gore, the British Ambassador, was told that on a recent visit to SAC, the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense had asked about the British contribution to a first strike and been informed that 
owing to the lower level of UK alert they ‘could only count upon eight V-bombers being 
certainly operational.  This compared with over a thousand bombers and rockets which the 
Americans judged would be available to them whatever the degree of surprise.’109 As for the 
UK’s national targeting plans – which after 1963 existed in parallel with the UK’s 
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contribution to SACEUR’s NATO planning – McNamara never seems to have taken them 
very seriously, since the contingencies in which they might come into operation were so 
remote as to make them irrelevant to U.S. nuclear strategy.  It was recognised that along with 
the existence of a firing chain under ultimate national control such plans were, nevertheless, 
necessary for political purposes.   
 What is clear is that unlike both President Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy, for 
example, McNamara was at first surprisingly oblivious to the domestic political 
consequences for the Macmillan government of the loss of Skybolt, and seemed unable to 
link the furore that had greeted his remarks at Ann Arbor to the implications that would 
inevitably be drawn by an attentive press, as well as nervous British officials, that there had 
been a premediated political decision to end the program.  Despite Kennedy’s own 
reservations at the time over the contents of the Ann Arbor speech, McNamara had been keen 
to deliver a direct message to America’s European allies that the U.S. nuclear guarantee was 
firm, but that they needed to make greater efforts to build-up NATO’s conventional military 
strength.  It is clear, however, that he also wanted to use the occasion to scold the French for 
their independent nuclear ambitions and – perhaps more crucially – signal to the rest of the 
administration, and to other potential proliferators, that the Defense Department was firmly 
opposed to the provision of nuclear assistance to additional nascent nuclear powers.  In his 
rush to stake out the Pentagon’s position in public McNamara overlooked the impact this 
would have on the domestic politics of America’s closest ally, where possession of an 
independent nuclear force had been an area of deep contention between the Conservative and 
Labour Parties. 
In period after his uneasy meeting with Thorneycroft on 11 December when he 
presented the reasons for Skybolt cancellation, McNamara seemed almost to be trying to 
compensate for the troubles he has helped to create.  When he presented to British officials 
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the formal State Department-inspired U.S. position that a Polaris replacement would have to 
be linked in some fashion with arrangements for a multilateral force he did so without 
enthusiasm.  His constructive performance at the subsequent Nassau Conference even 
prompted Macmillan to single out McNamara for praise, when one might have expected 
opprobrium to be heaped on his head for having made the initial decision to cancel 
Skybolt.
110
  After Nassau, McNamara was in fact keen to move ahead quickly with technical 
arrangements for the supply of Polaris to the UK, and had very little faith that the MLF 
scheme would come to fruition (although prepared to give it his backing in early 1963, he 
thought it has dubious military utility and should not be forced on the Europeans).
111
   
Finally, it must always be recalled that Kennedy, despite some doubts, had endorsed 
the controversial remarks that McNamara delivered at Ann Arbor.  They certainly reflected 
Kennedy’s own beliefs that in a world where the numbers of nuclear weapons, along with 
their physical dispersal, was increasing enormously, there should be a high premium placed 
on centralised control, lest decisions on nuclear release were taken without full consideration 
of the consequences.  At Nassau, Kennedy was willing to concede the ‘supreme national 
interests’ clause of the final communique in order to give tangible political cover to the 
Macmillan government’s claim that the future of an independent nuclear deterrent had been 
secured – Polaris would be allocated its own national targeting plans by the British authorities 
when it finally became operational in the late 1960s.  With press speculation rife over the 
troubled state of the Anglo-American relationship, resolution of the issues at Nassau had a 
great deal to do with Kennedy’s fundamental desire to give Macmillan what he needed to 
counter his domestic political critics.  At the end of December 1962, the President gave a 
background press briefing to reporters where he affirmed that the decision to cancel Skybolt 
was technical and financial, not political, in origin and that the offer of Polaris to the British 
‘was in keeping with both our technical and moral obligation to them, and I think that the 
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arrangement was made in the best interest of the United States, Britain, and the Alliance, 
because the British will have their deterrent.  It will be independent in moments of great 
national peril, which is really the only time you consider using nuclear weapons anyway.  It 
will serve as a basis for a multinational or multilateral force.’112     
As the remainder of his presidency was to show, Kennedy was however always a 
sceptic over the practicalities of forming an MLF, especially in the face of European doubts 
and opposition.  In February 1963, discussing with his senior advisers his own thoughts about 
the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, Kennedy had admitted with frank realism: 
‘the logical course for each country was to have its own deterrent.  Anything less was 
illogical.  By the same token, it was in the U.S. interest to retain the control it now had.’113 It 
was the tension between these two positions that had been exposed as a result of McNamara’s 
criticism of independent nuclear deterrents at Ann Arbor.  As long as there was no joint 
Franco-American nuclear planning, and the French continued to develop their nuclear 
capabilities free of dependence on, or control by the United States, the force de frappe was 
not a welcome development during the 1960s.  It was only when political circumstances had 
changed and de Gaulle had left the scene, after the Nixon administration entered office at the 
end of the decade, that nuclear assistance to France would eventually be forthcoming from 
the United States.  By then attitudes to European independent nuclear forces in Washington 
had undergone significant shifts, not least as the prospect of Germany acquiring nuclear 
weapons had receded, but also as concerns over proliferation in general assumed a less salient 
position in official thinking.
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